Under the traditional view of lying, the concept is usually taken to be a deviant speech act with the following characteristics: (1) being insincere and (2) being done with the intention to deceive. On the recent literature, however, (2) has come under attack by a class of counter examples that purport to show that the traditional view has been misguided. In this essay, our objective is twofold, we intend to: (a) present Lackey's defense of her take on the traditional conception; (b) present a different proposal about how to go about defending (2). This is important because, although we don't agree with Lackey's solution, we do agree that (2) is a necessary condition on a successful definition of lying, as evidenced by the fact that taking the deception clause out of [lying] leaves us with an overall loss of explanatory power with regards to a range of speech acts and the general ethics of communicative cooperation.
A problem for lies and deception
Here is how Lackey frames the problem. The traditional view of lying can be represented in the following way: LIE-T: A lies to B if and only if (1) A states that p to B, (2) A believes that p is false, (3) A intends to deceive B by stating that p. (LACKEY, 2013; 236) Kínesis, Vol. X, n° 23 (Edição Especial), Julho 2018, p.42-55 until the whole army of slaves is on their feet shouting, "I am Spartacus!" (Sorensen, 2010; 608) Coercion Lies: Suppose that an innocent bystander witnesses the murder of a gang member by someone from a rival gang, but is threatened with death if she testifies against the murderer. Because of this, the bystander states on the stand at trial, "I did not witness the defendant murder the victim in question." (LACKEY, 2013; 239) Bald-Faced Lies: Suppose that a student is caught flagrantly cheating on an exam for the fourth time this term, all of the conclusive evidence for which is passed on to the Dean of Academic Affairs. Both the student and the Dean both know that he cheated on the exam, and they each know that the other knows this, but the student is also aware of the fact that the Dean punishes students for academic dishonesty only when there is as confession. Given this, when the student is called to the Dean's office, he states, 'I did not cheat on the exam'. (LACKEY, 2013; 238) These alleged counterexamples are supposed to pose challenges to the view that lying involves deception because they appear to, intuitively, instantiate cases of lying where there is no intention to deceive. According to their proponents, the following is true:
1. In a case such as Knowledge Lies the speakers do not intend to deceive because they do not intend to make the hearer believe that p [I am Spartacus] (they merely aim to make him unable to believe that not-p and therefore suspend judgment with regards to p).
2. In a case such as Coercion Lies the speaker does not intend to deceive because their testimony is occurring under duress (they are not free choose, and where it entirely up to them they would not state that not-p).
3. In a case such as Bald-Faced Lies the speaker does not intend to deceive because he knows that the hearer already knows that p (therefore it does not look as the speaker is attempting to make the hearer believe that ~p). Due to these counterexamples, then, alternatives to the traditional view emerge. Here are the three most prominent ones: , 2007; 256) According to Lackey, these three proposals are "virtually identical in the first two conditions" (LACKEY, 2013; 240) except that the latter conditions can deal with cases of bullshit. What is interesting about these definitions though, is that, under her reading 3 , they all "share the common feature of completely divorcing lies from deception" (LACKEY, 2013; 240) . Because of this fact, they can, supposedly, deal with the three counterexamples presented above. To see why this is the case, consider:
LIE-F:

Under LIE-F, here is what happens in the counterexamples: (1) Knowledge lies appear to satisfy the definition (when the slaves statement "I am Spartacus", they certainly appear to believe themselves to be on a context where the following conversational norm: Do not make statements that you believe to be false, holds true);
(2) Coercion lies appear to satisfy the definition (it appears fairly obvious that when standing on a trial the aforementioned conversational norm holds true); (3) Bald faced
Lies appear to satisfy the definition (there is no reason, yet again, to think that the student thinks to be in a conversational context where the aforementioned conversational norm does not hold).
LIE-C:
Under LIE-C, here is what happens in the counterexamples: (1) Knowledge lies appear to satisfy the definition (when the slaves state "I am Spartacus", they intend to warrant the truth of their statement); (2) Coercion Lies appear to satisfy the definition (where it not the case that someone did intend to warrant the truth of their 2 Carson also appears to at some stages favor a condition that requires the actual falsity of the statement (as opposed to its mere insincerity). With regards to that question, we must confess to be off two minds (in particular we can see the merit of Turri's case made in TURRI & TURRI, 2015) , in one day we can see the case for falsity as a condition, in the other we cannot. However, regarding the question presented here and its connection with deception it does not look as if anything will turn on this debate, so we choose to leave it unscathed. Bald faced lies appear to satisfy the definition (the student asserts that he did not cheat even though he knows that he did it).
A problem for the absence of deception
LIE-F, LIE-C, and LIE-S, then, appear to provide the correct responses to the alleged counterexamples [at the cost of a counterintuitive separation between lies and deception].
Furthermore, the conditions imposed by their final clauses also appear to discriminate between lies and cases of false/insincere utterances that are usually explained by an appeal to the traditional clause of intention to deceive, namely, cases of irony and jokes 4 . Were this all that was to it, conceptions that tend to tie lying and deception together would indeed be faced with a serious challenge.
Unfortunately, just as there are counterexamples that challenge the idea that lying is a particular kind of deception, there are a class of counterexamples, namely cases of 'selfless assertion', that appear to show that lying and deception cannot so easily be divorced.
Consider the following case:
Creationist Teacher: Stella is a devoutly Christian fourth grade teacher, and her religious beliefs are grounded in a personal relationship with God that she takes herself to have had since she was a very young child. This relationship grounds her belief in the truth of creationism and, accordingly, a belief in the falsity of evolutionary theory. Despite this, Stella fully Kínesis, Vol. X, n° 23 (Edição Especial), Julho 2018, p.42-55 recognizes that there is an overwhelming amount of scientific evidence against both of these beliefs. Indeed, she readily admits that she is not basing her own commitment to creationism on evidence at all, but rather, on the personal faith that she has in all-powerful Creator. Because of this, Stella thinks that her religious beliefs are irrelevant to her duties as a teacher; accordingly, she regards her obligation as a teacher to include presenting material that is best supported by the available evidence, which clearly includes the truth of evolutionary theory. As a result, while presenting her biology lesson today, Stella asserts to her students, "Modern day Homo Sapiens evolved from Homo Erectus", though she herself does not believe that proposition. (LACKEY, 2006; 111) The contention here is that, despite the fact that an assertion such as the one made by Stella seems to fulfill all the requirements made by LIE-S, LIE-F and LIE-C, it would still be wrong to count this case as a lie 5 . Furthermore, it seems to be the case that the best (if not the only) explanation as to why this should not count as case of lying appeals to the concept of deception. To see that this is the case, just notice the following:
Even though Stella is being insincere (she does not believe what she asserts), she can recognize her beliefs as irrelevant for the appropriate assertion in the context of teaching 6 . Why would that be the case? The best (and again, if not the only) explanation seems to be that Stella does not want to deceive her students. If this is correct, then, we must abandon LIE-F, LIE-C and LIE-S and go back do definitions of lying that include some sort of deception clause.
Lackey's Solution
If what we have seen before in section 2 is correct, then analyzing lying without appealing to the concept of deception appears to be troublesome. However, due to the counterexamples presented in section 1, it appears that LIE-T cannot be taken to present a 5 Here it is important to note that even though we follow Lackey in taking cases of selfless assertions as counting as decisive evidence against the disassociation between lying and deceiving, we do not agree with her that these utterances are epistemically of conversationally proper. In this regard, we tend to agree with (BENTON, forthcoming) that cases like "selfless assertions" appear to be cases of vicious assertion (for a proposal as to what is wrong with cases like this see BORGES & MEDEIROS, 2016) . 6 One way to frame the point would be to point out that she recognizes that her beliefs do not fit the evidence(more on that later 
A different proposal
Lackey's proposal, then, attempts to solve the problem of the divorce between lies and deception by introducing a distinction between deceit and deception and that lying requires only the latter. Could this be all that there is to problem of lying? We contend that it is not.
In particular, we believe that Lackey's definition is not a good one because it looks as the distinction between deceit and deception misses the point. In an attempt to rescue lying from its separation from deception, the distinction weakens the concept of deception to the point that its description of lying becomes uninteresting and a somewhat misleading description of the phenomena. To see why this appears to be the case, consider what Lackey's definition does to explain such cases.
Under Lackey's description, cases such as Knowledge Lies and the others, merely deprives our cognitive economy of some goods (they are mere attempts at concealment of information). This is not ordinarily what lies do, nor is it why they are regarded as unethical actions or a special problem for the correct functioning off an epistemic agent's mental life.
Lies are troublesome because they aim to make us acquire damaged cognitive goods. To put it another way, lies are not troublesome because they are neutral towards our capacity as epistemic beings, they are troublesome because they aim to leave us worse of 7 .
In this sense, we believe that Lackey's proposal sets to low a bar for what it is to lie.
In what follows, we attempt by to show, by taking a closer look at each of the troublesome cases, that a more general defense of the ordinary (or something very close to it) concept of deception does a better job at giving us a definition of lying.
Knowledge lies
Is there any way that we can attempt to save the ordinary conception of deception in a case such as the one involving Spartacus? We contend that there is. 1. Antonius lies with the intention to deceive when he asserts p.
2. From S1 to Sn, Si lies without the intention to deceive when they assert p.
Is this a fair description of what is happening in the case? Our contention is that it is
not. We contend that this description leaves much unexplained in the case and that a closer look shows how we can restore talk of deception in a case such as this. To see how that would be the case, consider the following question:
In virtue of what can the assertions made by S1….Sn prevent Crassus from knowing ~p? That is to say, what is the role that the assertions made by the subsequent slaves play in the explanation of the case?
The most plausible answer to this question appears to be something like this: There is a falsity in the neighborhood (that is implied by the assertions done by each Sn) that explains why an assertion such as p can be relevant for Crassus inability to determine who is Spartacus. In other words, for each asserter Si we can construct a relevant falsity pi that plays the explanatory role as to why that assertion is relevant for the case. Furthermore, we can quite easily and plausibly specify what this falsity consists on, namely, it would consist on the recursively built disjunction (p v pi v …pn) [where each instance of p corresponds to the assertion by Si "I am Spartacus"]. This explanation then would make it so that the following description of the Knowledge Lies case appeared to be accurate:
1a. Antonius lies with the intention to deceive when he asserts p.
2a. From S1 to Sn, Si lies with the intention to deceive when they assert that p, because they have the intention to make the hearer believe that (p vp1 …v pn).
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If this explanation is correct, it appears that we can talk in the usual sense about deception in Knowledge Lies cases.
Coercion Lies
The force of the counterexample in common lies seems to rest in the fact that even though the asserter undoubtedly does lie in the case, he does so unwittingly. In particular, the contention is that because the asserter is lying while under duress, the asserter does not intend to lie and therefore does not have the intention to deceive. Because of this, proponents of this type of counterexample take the following to be true:
1. S does not want to lie, but is being forced to do so.
2. If S does not want to lie, but is being forced to do so, then S has no intention to lie and therefore no intention to deceive.
3. S has no intention to deceive. (From 1 and 2 Suppose that, while going through your early morning run, you and a friend are held at gunpoint by a lunatic who takes the two of you to the M&T Bank Stadium and says that he will release both of you only after you perform a forty yards field goal. With no other option, you immediately position yourself at the thirty-yard line and begin to kick the balls that your friend is holding in position for you. If we take the analogy seriously, the proponent of coercion lies would have to endorse the following.
1a. S does not want to perform a forty-yard field goal, but he is being forced to do so.
2a. If S does not want to perform a forty-yard field goal, but he is being forced to do so, then S has no intention to perform a forty-yard field goal and therefore has no intention to kick the ball precisely between the Y at the appointed distance.
3a. S has no intention to kick the ball precisely between the Y at the appointed distance. (From 1,2) Despite having the exact same structure, the conclusion of the second argument seems absurd. Furthermore, we take it, that the reason that it seems absurd is that the argument relies on the ambiguity surrounding the term intention. What the analogy shows is that there appears to be two senses of intention at play here, senses that we propose that we differentiate in the following way:
Intentiond-S has intentiond towards a goal when he has a desire that the given goal come to be the case.
Intentionc-S has intentionc towards a goal when he acts in a way that may (under the right circumstances) bring about that goal. Kínesis 1b. S does not want to lie, but is being forced to do so.
2b. If S does not want to lie, but is being forced to do so, then S has no intentiond to lie and therefore no intentiond to deceive.
S has no intentionc to deceive. (From 1 and 2)
This argument is clearly not valid. Furthermore, if the distinction is correct and captured appropriately by its application in the argument, we can also see how it would quite naturally appear to be the case that argument of the coercive lies proponent appears to be correct. For even though intentiond and intentionc present different senses of the same word, it remains quite easy to see how the two are usually tied together, that is to say, in most cases of intention a desire for something to be the case conducts to an action that intends to make it so that something is the case 9 . If what is said here is correct, then the application of the distinction between the relevant senses of intention allows us to preserve the usual talk about the intention to deceive in cases of coercion lies.
Bald-Faced lies
Bald-Faced lies appear to pose the most trouble for a simple defense of the notion of intention to deceive in lying. The reason for that is that cases of Bald-Faced Lies appear to rely on the common knowledge of the truth of what the speaker is trying to deny to the hearer.
Under this reading then, it appears quite natural to see how the intention to deceive can be challenged by such cases.
Is this challenge enough to pose an insurmountable obstacle to the project however?
The contention here is that it is not. Too see why there appears to still be some room for Surely not! When the student is stating something like "I did not cheat" he is not merely concealing evidence from the Dean, he is effectively stating, and therefore putting forth in the public domain, the contention that he did not cheat in the exam. It doesn't take much of a theory of statements or of assertions to say that insofar as the student is stating/asserting that "I did not cheat" he is offering his statement/assertion as evidence against the hypotheses that he did cheat in the exam. The reason that we are inclined to think that this cannot happen in the case is that the Dean already knows that he did cheat. Notice, however, that the Dean is not ready to punish the student merely on the account of his own knowledge. This fact, by its turn, means that for this particular case, knowledge is not enough to provide a reason for action, that is to say the evidentiary standard required for action here may be construed as 
Conclusion
In this essay, we have attempted to examine the debate concerning the idea that lies involves intention to deceive. We have taken a look at the objections to the idea and found then wanting. Furthermore, we have taken a look at Lackey's argument based on cases of selfless assertions and found it a compelling additional reason for argument that lying is indeed tied to deception. However, when it comes to the precise way upon which this connection is fleshed out, we have parted ways with Lackey's approach. The chief reason for that consisted in the fact that her distinction regarding deception appeared to (aside from making the general concept less clear and somewhat artificial) weaken the concept of lying to a point that it did not seemed to fully capture the phenomena. Taking that into account, we have attempted to provide an examination of the usual counterexamples in way that they can be interpreted so as to not pose such a challenge to the usual analysis represented by LIE-T.
With regard to that we have some final observations. The points made about the cases of knowledge lies and coercion lies can be taken independently as objections to the specific counterexamples. In that sense, even someone who is unsatisfied with our general conception presented in bald faced lies can take the objections presented in the former two in their defense of lying as a kind of deception. With regard to the general conception of deception presented in the final section, it should be quite easy to see that the point appears to 12 And what is to aim to provide misleading evidence? To provide misleading evidence is generally understood as to provide evidence for a falsity. On the other hand, we might want to say that to aim to provide misleading evidence is, very roughly, to provide evidence that goes against a hypothesis that is well regarded on your own total evidence. That is to say, for two agents S1 and S2: The statement that p has the following evidentiary role: E1 makes it so that P(HI E1&k) < P(HI k) [for S2 where H is the hypothesis that p, E1 is the evidence provided by S1 and K is S2's prior evidence] ,and P(HI k) > P(~HI k) [for S1 where H is the hypothesis that p, and k is S1 total evidence].
generalize. Furthermore, we would also like to point out that the conception delivers the correct verdict in cases of selfless assertions and other problematic cases and that it appears to do justice to a stronger, ordinary, conception of lying. To summarize, we contend that our strategy to preserve LIE-T proves itself fruitful because it also appears to capture accurately the phenomena of lying in the sense that it preserves the ordinary sense on which lying consists in a specific type of communication act that is harmful for an epistemic agent's cognitive life.
